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Introduction
While several Asian states have been lingering over their South China 
Sea territorial disputes for decades now, it has become almost convention-
al wisdom that the main trigger behind is the expected mineral resource 
deposits in its seabed. However, Sato (2007, p. 123) points out that fish 
stocks are important along with the natural oil, although thishascalled 
the attention of much fewer observers. The South China Sea is one of 
the most abundant commercial fisheries areas in the world (Wang 2001). 
Butnear China’s coasts fishing has been limited since 1980s due to over-
fishing. Together with the Gulf of Tonkin – the major fishing grounds of 
the 1950s – these areasare said to exist merely in name (Liang and Jiang 
2012). According to Xinhua (2012) news agency, Hainan reports only 
around 80 thousand tons of annual catch. At the same time, Sansha area 
further away in the South China Sea is reported to holdfishery reserves of 
about 5 million tons, while annual sea catch under 2 million tons would 
still allow sustainable development (Xinhua 2012a).
This paper aims at examining what impact the depletion of coast-
al fish stocks and resulting tightening control had on China’s territorial 
disputes in the  South China Sea. In late 1970s, besides its naval and 
commercial shipping force, the PRC was also steadily developing fisher-
ies, and, according to Chiu (1977), since the disputed islands could also 
be used as fishing bases, China was not expected to soften its territorial 
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claims. Rau (1986) argued that fish, although to a lesser extent than oil, 
would be the  focal points of present disputes and future conflict. Oth-
ers have drafted more optimistic scenarios. According to Valencia (2003), 
China managed to develop a  conflict avoidance regime for fisheries in 
the areas disputed with Japan in the East China Sea. It was made possible 
through China-Japan Fisheries Agreement, which was renewed in 2000. 
Wang (2001) discussed whether similar fisheries cooperation framework 
could resolve the dispute in the South China Sea. At present, the role of 
fisheries in the territorial disputes is as important as ever, since Chinese 
government at the end of 2012 announced it was to strengthen the coun-
try’s marine economy.
In this paper, to examine what implications fisheries industry – its 
tighter regulation and development – had for the  territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea, first the regulative policy measures are introduced. 
They are followed by a discussion on their impact on the disputed territo-
ries. Further, the paper examines the resulting effect on China’s territorial 
disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, China’s closest neighbors in 
the  disputed sea. The  discussion includes the  fishing moratorium, in-
cidents involving fishermen, as well as the activities of China’s coastal 
authorities. Finally, the paper concludes byevaluating whether marine en-
vironmental degradation in the coastal waters facilitated confrontation or, 
the opposite, it encouraged the claimant states’ efforts for fisheries coop-
eration in the disputed waters.
The analysis covers the period since early 1980s, when overfishing 
in coastal waters entered the  policy agenda of China, and eventually 
the state-owned enterprises, collectives, and individuals were allowed to 
engage in fisheries (State Council 1985). Over the decades, it remained 
an important issue and the  government continuedto build a  regulato-
ry framework. In February 2013, the Standing Committee of the State 
Council meeting once again confirmed the policy to promote sustaina-
ble development of marine fisheries. The meetingconcluded that marine 
fishing moratorium (haiyang fuji xiuuyu zhidu) should be strictly imple-
mented and fishing intensity in coastal waters controlled (State Council 
2013a). At the same time, the Opinionadopted by the meeting provided 
that the fisheries in coastal waters should be developed along with the dis-
tant water fisheries (State Council 2013b). At the  regional level, 2012 
witnessed especially active effort to promote fisheries in the South China 
Sea. In March, the Government of Hainan Province and the State-owned 
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Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
signed strategic cooperation framework agreement, based on which sev-
eral fishing expeditions in the South China Sea were launched soon af-
terwards. That is to say, in the future, China’s marine environment will 
remain to be managed strictly, while the fisheries industry are set to be 
developed actively, which would no doubt have implications for China’s 
maritime disputes. The core objective of this paper is to examine these 
implications until now.
Fisheries regulations in China
In 1979, national aquatic products conference in China raised con-
cerns over the depleted coastal waters and marine environment pollution. 
In February Regulations of the  Reproduction and Protection of Aquat-
ic Resources were adopted. After hearing the  fisheries work report of 
the General Bureau of Aquatic Productsthe same year, the Secretariat of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee instructed to 
draft and promulgate fisheries law. Presenting its draft at the 13th Plenum 
of the 6thNational People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee on No-
vember 13, 1985, Zhu Rong, the Vice-minister of Agriculture, Livestock, 
and Fisheries, emphasized that water pollution, leading to poisoning of 
fish, caused worries among fishermen, some of who had even lost their 
livelihood. According to his report, as the supply was tight and demand 
increasingly high, “the masses urge[d] for the improvement of such situ-
ation” (NPC 1985).
Throughout the  1980s, the  legal basis for marine environmental 
control was established. Marine Environmental Protection Law of 1982, 
and Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of 1984 were clear signs 
that the government was aware of the necessity to control marine envi-
ronment. Finally, in January 1986, the NPC adopted the Fisheries Law, 
which went into effect on July 1 the same year. Besides other fisheries-re-
lated issues, the law also established institutional framework for marine 
fisheries management, and provided that marine fishing activities, when 
large trawls and purse were used, could be conducted only with a license 
granted upon approval by the department of fishery administration under 
the State Council. Also, it established quota system for marine fishing 
licenses. In 1987, China started controlling fishing boat horsepower.
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In late 1990s, the Information Office of the State Council summarized 
these continuous efforts: “China attaches great importance to the protec-
tion of marine fisheries resources, and has adopted various measures to 
conserve such resources so as to guarantee the implementation of a sus-
tainable marine development strategy” (Information Office 1998, part II). 
China Ocean Agenda 21 declared a sustainable development strategy for 
China’s marine programs in 1996 (Information Office 1998, part I). In 
1999, the hot season moratorium, in force in the East China, Yellow and 
Bohai seas since 1995, was further extended to include the South China 
Sea. Since then, in the South China Sea, fishing ban has been announced 
annually through June to July, and then in 2009 extended from May 16 
to August 1.
In 1999, the government initiated a management objective of “zero 
growth” in coastal marine capture catch, which was further extended 
to “minus growth” in 2001. These measures marked the  beginning of 
a  more comprehensive approach toward environmental management. 
The government not only applied “output control” (restriction of fishing 
activities) but also sought to reduce China’s fishing power –  to employ 
“input control measures”. In 2002, a new program aimed at reducing 220 
000 vessels with a total power of 12.7 million kW and the catch of 13.06 
million tonto 192 000 vessels with 11.43 million kW and 12 million 
ton catch by 2010. State Council issued similar guidelines in 2003 (FAO 
2012, 52), and by the end of 2004 it had assigned nearly 100 million US 
dollars to scrap almost 8000 vessels and relocate over 40 thousand fish-
ermen (FAO 2006).
Food and Agriculture Organization of the  United Nations (FAO) 
reports that the  marine fishing vessel reduction plan for 2003–2010 
achieved reduction by 2008 close to the target. Nonetheless, since then 
both the number of vessels and total combined power started to increase 
again (FAO 2012, 11). In short, just before 2010, China already had its 
maritime environment and fisheries regulations in place, and at the same 
time excessive fishing capacity. And moving offshore seems to have been 
the solution.
Extensive fisheries control measures notwithstanding, environmental 
pollution in China’s coastal waters remained an important obstacle for 
fisheries industry. In 1996, Chinese newspaper Guangming Daily report-
ed on water pollution in an article titled “Pollution: the killer of fisheries 
resources”. The same year, People’s Daily, commemorating 10years since 
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the adoption of Fisheries Law in China, reported that decline of fish stock 
in coastal waters was still an important issue (People’s Daily 1996).
From a legal point of view, the most dramatic effect on the disputed 
territories was China’s unilateral summer fishing ban. As China sought to 
control overfishing in its territorial waters, the moratorium covering areas 
north of the 12th parallel, was designed to include the Scarborough Shoal 
(Huangyan Island in Chinese; Panatag Shoal in Tagalog), claimed by both 
China and the Philippines, and the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands in Chi-
nese; Hoang Sa Islands in Vietnamese), disputed between China and Viet-
nam. On the other hand, the most of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands 
in Chinese), partially claimed by all three states as well as their neighbors, 
were not covered. Its further implications are discussed in part 2.1 below.
Fisheries control was only one side of marine environmental manage-
ment policy. For China, in the very early beginning of the economic re-
forms, expanding economic activities, fisheries in this particular case, was 
nonetheless important. Further, fish provides 4.3 billion people around 
the world with more that 15 percent of their protein intake (FAO 2012, 
5). In late 1970s, for China just recovering after the devastating outcomes 
of the Great Cultural Revolution food supply was and later remained to be 
a sensitive issue. And here marine production could not be overlooked. At 
that time the dilemma – higher production or environment first – could 
be solved easier. The  explanation of the  fisheries law in mid-1980s in 
addition to strict control of the exploitation of the coastal marine envi-
ronment called for the development of offshore fisheries (NPC 1985). At 
its very core, it meant going further away from the coastline. And this 
policy line was maintained later. The  Development of China’s Marine 
Programs provided that “in accordance with the actual conditions of ma-
rine fisheries resources China has actively readjusted the structure of this 
sector, […] actively exploited new resources and fishing grounds, so as to 
make the fishing industry constantly adapt to the changes in the struc-
ture of marine resources” (Information Office 1998, part II). As a result, 
the tighter the regulations are, the more fisheries industry is encouraged 
to move further into the disputed waters, a development, which no doubt 
has its implications for China’s maritime territorial disputes.
Going offshore, which requires additional investment and upgrading 
of fishing vessels, was implemented in China through state support as 
well as private funds. State support for the offshore fisheries development 
was basically implemented through subsidies, administered at the  local 
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level. The practice to subsidize fisheries was introduced after 2000. For 
example in Hainan, the fishermen of the province, fishermen cooperatives 
and marine fishing leading enterprises were entitled to renovate boats 
above certain tonnage. This was done seeking to promote development 
of offshore fisheries around the Zhongsha Islands1and the Paracel Islands 
in the South China Sea (The People’s Government of Hainan Province 
2010). The standard subsidies per ship were 100 thousand Chineseyuan.
Yet, state subsidies for fisheries industry were more allocated to 
the  development of China’s distant water fishing. Thus, for the  South 
China Sea fisheries more private initiatives emerged. In 2006, Chinese 
media published a report on Jinalang – “the richest village in Yangjiang 
prefecture-level city” Yangxi county in Guangdong province. According to 
the report, the village’s annual income per capita grew from 3,500 yuan in 
1997 to 54,800 yuan in 2006. When the government announced it would 
introduce South China Sea summer fishing moratorium in 1999, many 
fishermen in coastal areas started selling off their boats. At the same time 
several villagers in Jinalang invested in more powerful, better equipped 
boats to be able to fish in deeper waters (Hou 2006).
Hainan Island fishermen took a similar initiative to arrange a fishing 
fleet of 30 boats to be able to fish at Zhubi Shoal in the Scarborough Shoal 
(Xinhua 2012a). According to a fishery official in Sanya, “Hainan aims 
to shift the  focus of its fishery industry from near-shore fishing to far 
offshore fishing. Fishermen are encouraged to ‘build big boats and explore 
the deep sea.’” According to them, if successful, fisheries in the disputed 
islands, now administered by  a  newly-established Sansha prefecture in 
the Paracel Islands, would be developed further (Xinhua 2012a).
Rising tensions in the territorial disputes
In late 1970s and later, some argued that China would maintain, if 
not strengthen, its territorial claims in the South China Sea as it intended 
to develop fisheries there. By introducing hot season fishing moratorium 
in 1999, China did reinforce its territorial claims. The  ban extends to 
the territories also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. It is appli-
cable not only to Chinese but also foreign vessels, and the violators may 
1 Underwater reefs and shoals in the South China Sea, which lies east of the Paracel 
Islands, southwest of the Pratas Islands and north of the Spratly Islands.
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have their catches and boats confiscated and also get fined up to 50,000 
Chinese yuan (Xinhua 2012b). According to the South China Fishery Ad-
ministration Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, “Fishing activity of 
foreign ships in the banned areas will be seen as a blatant encroachment 
on China’s fishery resources” (Xinhua 2009).
By its annual fishing moratorium China makes the governments of 
neighboring countries choose whether to acknowledge the regulations or 
stand firmly for their sovereignty rights dismissing the  ban – a  dilem-
ma not overlooked by Chinese media (Zhang 2012). The actual implica-
tions of the fishing ban on the territorial disputes depend greatly on their 
response. And although neither Vietnam, nor the  Philippines accepted 
the regulations unilaterally imposed by China, the two countries respond-
ed differently.
Vietnamese government objected the mid-summer fishing ban repeat-
edly since it was introduce in 1999. In May 2003 the Vietnamese Foreign 
Ministry declared that Vietnam had undisputed “sovereignty” rights over 
the Paracel and Spratly islands” (CNN 2011). In 2009, Vietnam’s Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs called the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi urging China 
to cease operations in the  sea (Xinhua 2009) that is to stop patrolling 
during the fishing moratorium. Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Ho 
Xuan Son was quoted telling Chinese Ambassador to Vietnam Sun Guox-
iang that increased Chinese patrols had led to more arrests and fines af-
fecting “normal fishing activities by Vietnamese fishermen in Vietnam’s 
traditional fishing grounds”. In 2012, Foreign Ministry spokesman Luong 
Thanh Nghi posted a  statement on the ministry’s website stating that 
Vietnam considers China’s decision to impose the fishing ban “invalid” 
(Associated Press 2012).
Just like Vietnam, the Philippines have never acknowledged the fish-
ing ban as it also applies to the disputed Scarborough Shoal. On the other 
hand, the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) 
announced different fishing regulations that apply to the same territory. 
This fishing moratorium nearly overlaps with the Chinese one: in 2012, 
the ban lasted from May 16 to July 15 (Department of Agriculture 2012). 
The BFAR also searched for an alternative solution to alleviate the impact 
of fishing ban on the local fishermen. In the areas off the coastal provinc-
es it deployed “payao”, a fish-aggregating device that attracts small fish, 
which later serve as food for the  bigger fish such as tuna. The  bureau 
planned to set up a total of 200 “payao” in appropriate municipal waters 
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and provide the fishermen with a specific location to fish (Department of 
Agriculture 2012).
In short, while the Vietnamese government rejected China’s fishing 
moratorium, the  Philippine government sought to accommodate to it, 
balancing between Chinese regulations and protection of its sovereignty 
rights. The  chairman of the Vietnam Fisheries Association was quoted 
saying in 2010 that the “[Vietnamese] fishermen are not dispirited and 
they will go offshore as normal” (M&C News 2011). The consequences 
of this position are reflected in the number of incidents, further discussed 
in part 2.2. In the period from 1999 to 2012, there were four incidents 
involving Vietnamese fishermen that occurred during the  moratorium 
season inthe area where it was enforced. Such incidents involving Phil-
ippine fishermen were not observed. While fishing moratorium can raise 
tensions in territorial disputes, its actual implications depend on the re-
sponse from the other claimant states.
Further, during the mid-summer fishing ban, all of the incidents in-
volving Chinese fishermen (4 incidents) occurred near Spratly Islands, 
which were not covered by the ban. In this way, the fishing ban increased 
tensions between China and its near neighbors as Chinese fishermen 
were searching for alternative fishing grounds.
Fishing incidents as a source of bilateral conflict
Fishermen activities may be deemed to be a  trigger for a  conflict. 
In 2010, the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain near the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands led to a crisis in China-Japan bilateral relations; in July 
2012, 36 Chinese fishermen were detained in Russian territorial waters, 
and also earlier – near Indonesia. Hyer (1995, 45) notes that after some 
years of calm, the dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands intensified as To-
kyo sought to more aggressively prevent the Chinese fishermen and oth-
er forms of entering the  territories. In the South China Sea, Stephanie 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt (2012) argues, “fishing has emerged as a larger potential 
driver of conflict” rather than the mineral resources: “as overfishing con-
tinues to deplete coastal stocks through Southeast Asia, fishermen are 
venturing out further into disputed waters”.
The Chinese fishing boats could seldom be spotted in the South Chi-
na Sea before 1985 (Chongqing Morning Post 2012), when the local fish-
ermen started searching for better fishing grounds, just like in the  late 
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1920s when shrinking fish stocks in the East China Sea forced local fish-
ermen deeper into the  sea (Muscolino 2009). This time more Chinese 
fishermen had gone to the disputed waters, especially when the harvest 
was not good enough in other areas (Wong 2010).
According to China’s Chief of the South China Sea Fishery Bureau un-
der the Ministry of Agriculture, by the end of 2012, in total there had been 
around 400 incidents involving Chinese fishermen and the nationals of 
the neighbor countries around the Spratly Islands (Nanfang Daily 2012). 
Incomplete statistics from the same department show that from 1989 to 
2010, there had been 380 such incidents that involved 11300 Chinese 
fishermen (Xinmin Evening News 2012). Data released by the Tanmen 
town government in Hainan Province, Qinghai City, shows that since 
2000 there have been 117 similar cases where fishermen of Tanmen town 
were involved (Xinmin Evening News 2012). While accurate data is hard 
to obtain, local media reports that such cases in the disputed waters have 
peaked after 2000 (The Beijing News 2012).
For the purpose of this research, media reports on the incidents involv-
ing Chinese and the Philippine or Vietnamese fishermen were analyzed. 
In total, since 1995, 46 incidents were observed. The findings are sum-
marized in Table 1 (see Appendix for a detailed list of the incidents). As 
the Chinese fishermen moved further away from the coastline, the num-
ber of incidents involving civil vessels in the South China Sea increased. 
Especially large number of them occurred in 2008–2001 between Chinese 
fishermen and the Philippine coastal authorities. Philippine government 
actively sought to reduce the tensions. In 2000, Defense Secretary Orlan-
do Mercado instructed the Navy to persuade intruders to leave the Phil-
ippine territorial waters and avoid direct confrontation. He later ordered 
preventive action instead of arresting Chinese fishermen.
Chinese government also attempted to prevent the incidents. In 2008 
the State Council issued a directive for the Coast Guard and the fishery 
authorities to ban Chinese fishing vessels from entering “key sensitive 
maritime areas” (Cossa and Glosserman 2009).
Departure point of this analysis was the argument that as environ-
ment deteriorated in coastal waters and regulations in China tightened, 
its fishermen moved further offshore into the disputed waters thus in-
creasing tensions between China and its neighbors. Yet, the response of 
the fishermen is only one side of the argument. The actual enforcement 
of these regulations is nonetheless important.
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Table 1. Fishermen-involving incidents in the South China Sea (1995–1999)
Chinese fisher-
men – Vietnam-
ese authorities
Chinese fisher-
men – Philip-
pines authorities
Philippine fish-
ermen – Chinese 
authorities
Vietnamese fish-
ermen – Chinese 
authorities
2007–2012 1 2 1 10
2002–2006 1 2 – –
2000–2001 2 20 – –
1995–1999 – 6 1 –
Source: compiled by the author.
In this respect the  middle of the  last decade was a  turning point. 
Among the  46 incidents observed by  this study, 12 involved Chinese 
authorities and 11 of them occurred since 2007. That is to say, most 
of the earlier incidents occurred as a result of the fishermen’s activities 
as compared to only 3 out of 14 observed Chinese fishermen-involving 
incidents after 2007. Vietnamese officials reportedly complain that over 
the last several years, Chinese authorities have arrested hundreds of their 
fishing boats (The Straits Times 2012). Glaser also notes increased activ-
ity of the Chinese authorities. Reportedly, in 2009–2010, they detained 
an unusually large number of the  Vietnamese trawlers (Glasier 2011). 
According to the data provided by Vietnam, there have been 63 fishing 
boats with 725 seized by the Chinese authorities since 2005 in the South 
China Sea (Mydans 2010).
Chinese authorities declare that their task is to protect China’s fish-
ing grounds, and its fishermen respectively. The incidents in the sea have 
reportedly affected the fishermen, and it had a negative impact on China’s 
marine production (Xinmin Evening News 2012). Accordingly, Chief of 
the South China Sea Fishery Bureau states that they should protect Chi-
nese fishermen at all costs (Nanfang Daily 2012). In March 2009, China 
dispatched fishery patrol ship of the PLA Navy to the South China Sea, 
which would patrol in the disputed waters around the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands (Regional Chronology 2009, 13). In December 2012, Hainan is-
land’s provincial legislature passed a new regulation, which allows the bor-
der police to board and search vessels deemed to be operating illegally in 
what China considers Hainan’s waters. But the full text of the regulations 
was not made public and the precise area is not known. Based on the re-
ports, these rules were not imposed by the central government. Instead, 
local law enforcement agencies were said to have initiated it (Ruwitch and 
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Martina 2012). Furthermore, Xinhua (2013) news agency announced that 
China would “conduct daily fishery administrative patrols in the South 
China Sea in 2014 to better safeguard the legitimate interests of domes-
tic fishermen”. Such developments heighten the  tension in the disput-
ed waters. On November 29,2012, Vietnam signed a decree stating that 
civilian-led patrols, backed by marine police and border force, would be 
deployed from January 25 of the  following year to prevent the break of 
the fishing laws in Vietnam’s waters by foreign vessels (Reuters 2012).
Fisheries cooperation
The case of Northeast Asia (Valencia and Amae2003) suggests that 
cooperation in fisheries could be used as means to manage territorial dis-
putes. Yet, cooperation implies government’s policies must be adjusted 
to one another (Keohane 1985, 243). Hot season fishing moratorium im-
posed by  China unilaterally for 15 years and objected by  its neighbors 
annually shows that so far political will to cooperate has been limited. 
However, a number of cooperation initiatives emerged. The most fruitful 
bilateral efforts between China and Vietnam resulted in fisheries agree-
ment in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf in Chinese). After a few rounds of 
negotiations, it was signed on 25 December 2000in addition to the Agree-
ment on the  Delimitation of the  Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic 
Zones and Continental Shelves in the Beibu Gulf. During the negotia-
tions, China took the initiative to cooperate in the field of fisheries. “Chi-
nese side stated expressly that boundary delimitation must be linked to 
a  fishery arrangement, and that an agreement for delimitation and an 
agreement for fishery cooperation must be simultaneously signed and en-
tered into force” (Zou 2005).
Although both agreements were ratified only later in 2004, China 
took relatively cooperative stance in regards to the development of fish-
eries. On March 5, 2003 China announced that it would significantly 
reduce its Hainan Island fishing fleet under this agreement. The province 
was said to remove 570 fishing boats from service, and transfer 12,800 
fishermen to employment in other sectors (Breckon 2013). After that, in 
accordance with the agreement, the two countries conducted a joint patrol 
of the shared fishing area in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Fisheries Agreement in the  Gulf of Tonkin was a  tool of bounda-
ry dispute management. However, it could hardly serve as a model for 
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the disputes in the South China Sea, which has remained an important 
fishing ground. According to Mo Zhaolan, a researcher at China’s Insti-
tute of Oceanology, the Gulf of Tonkin, one of the major fishing grounds 
in the 1950s, now is completely overfished (Liang and Jiang 2012). There-
fore, this pattern of cooperation would not necessarily be used by China 
in other disputed, but more fish-rich, waters.
Similar initiatives were raised by another claimant state. On Febru-
ary 19, 2000, the Philippine Defense Secretary Mercado proposed a trea-
ty to declare the disputed South China Sea a “common fishing ground” 
for claimant nations, which would be modeled on the Antarctic Treaty 
(Thayer 2000, 53). The  initiative coming from the  Defense Secretary 
rather than agriculture department indicates its role in the management 
of the territorial dispute. Later, in 2004, Agriculture Ministry-level Mem-
orandum of Understanding on Fisheries Cooperation was signed between 
the Philippines and China. In January 2007, it was followed by the Mem-
orandum of Understanding on Expanding and Deepening Agriculture 
and Fisheries Cooperation and the Memorandum of Agreement on Co-
operation By and Between the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
(BFAR) and Guangdong Ocean Fisheries Administration (GDOFA). A year 
later, China and the Philippines agreed to set up a common fishing area in 
the disputed South China Sea (Reuters 2008). 
However, these agreements have never been negotiated into a detailed 
treaty clearly establishing international regime for fisheries. Further, co-
operation in regards to particular disputed areas has not emerged either, 
while in June 2010 the Philippines and Vietnam signed a memorandum 
of agreement for cooperation in fishing, conducting search and rescue ac-
tivities, and carrying out joint aquaculture projects in the Spratly Islands 
(Ministry of Agriculture 2010).
Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the link between increasingly strictfisheries 
regulation in China, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. We 
inquired whether tightening control had further complicated the disputes 
or, in contrary, served as an axis for cooperation. The discussion above 
demonstrated that since 1980s Chinese government took strict measures 
to alleviate overfishing in its coastal waters. This forced Chinese fisher-
men deeper into the disputed waters.
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From the analysis in the paper it may be concluded that three vari-
ables define what implications China’s fisheries regulations have on its 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. First, the countries’ general 
bilateral relationship and response to their counterpart’s actions are im-
portant. For example, China’s unilateral hot season fishing moratorium 
might provoke a conflict depending on the response from the other states. 
Vietnamese government rejected and repeatedly protested the ban, and 
negative implications were reflected in the  higher number of incidents 
involving Vietnamese fishermen. At the same time, as the Philippine gov-
ernment introduced its own nearly overlapping fishing ban, the incidents 
were absent during the non-fishing season. In this way, the Philippines 
and China established unofficial conflict avoidance regime, which was 
never possible with Vietnam. Further, when the Philippine government 
ruled out that the coastal security authorities should take preventive ac-
tion rather than arresting foreign fishermen, the number of incidents de-
creased.
Secondly, activities of private fishermen proved to be nonetheless im-
portant. Fish stock depletion in coastal waters forced them to seek for new 
fishing grounds – often in the disputed waters. This led to an increasing-
ly high number of incidents in the disputed territories, which peaked in 
around 2000. However, the potential role of Chinese fishermen in conflict 
escalation declined later.
The  third factor, which appears to be of increasing importance in 
these territorial disputes, was Chinese coastal authorities. The middle of 
the last decade marked a turning point: while the majority of incidents 
before involved Chinese fishermen, since 2007 more of them occurred 
during the patrols of the authorities. They argued to be protecting the in-
terests of Chinese fishermen and sought to prevent Vietnamese or, less 
often, Philippine boats from fishing in disputed waters. This is the major 
shift – from fishermen to coastal authorities – that occurred during the re-
cent decades. Such observations confirm that recently China might be 
using fisheries as an excuse to reinforce its territorial claims in the South 
China Sea.
While these are the major factors that define the status quo in the area, 
the analysis showed that coastal environmental degradation and tighter 
fisheries control does not necessarily lead to a  conflict. Yet, in the dis-
puted areas with rich fishing grounds no workable frameworks leading to 
an international fisheries regime could be observed. That is to say, so far 
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there exist no checks that could curb potential conflict, which now could 
be facilitated more by Chinese coastal authorities rather than its fisher-
men in search for fishing grounds.
APPENDIX
Incidents between China and the Philippines or Vietnam in the South 
China Sea involving fishing boats, 1990–2012 (dark gray marks the in-
cidents during China’s mid-summer moratorium in moratorium zone; 
light gray – during the moratorium but outside of the moratorium zone), 
compiled by the author.
Date Approximate 
Location
Countries in-
volved (fisher-
men – related 
authorities)
Incident
1 2 3 4
2012 
April 8
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The beginning of the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff; A Philippine Navy surveil-
lance plane spots 8 Chinese fishing 
vessels docked at the waters of Scarbor-
ough shoal; on April 10, the catch of 
the fishing vessels inspected.
2012 
March 3
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
Chinese authorities detain 21 Viet-
namese fishermen and their two boats 
for fishing in waters near the Paracel 
Islands
2012 Febru-
ary 22
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
Vietnamese fishermen blocked from 
seeking refuge in a storm; their fishing 
craft shot at and damaged by a China 
Marine Surveillance vessel
2011 Octo-
ber 18
The Spratly 
Islands (Reed 
Bank)
China–the Phili-
pines
Chinese fishing vessel crosses path 
of disabled Philippine Navy patrol in 
a near collision
2011 July 5
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
Sailors from China’s navy beat the cap-
tain of a Vietnamese fishing boat and 
confiscate its catch
2011 June 9
The Spratly 
archipela-
go (Wanan 
Bank)
China–Vietnam
Vietnam accuses a Chinese fishing boat 
of ramming cables from an oil explora-
tion vessel
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2011 June 1
The Spratly 
Islands
Vietnam–China
Chinese military vessels reported to 
threaten to fire on a Vietnamese fishing 
boat
2011 Febru-
ary 25
The Spratly 
Islands (Reed 
Bank)
The Philippines–
China
PLAN frigate fires 3 shots at 4 Filipino 
fishing boats
2010 Sep-
tember 11
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
Vietnamese fishermen detained and 
their boat impounded; released Octo-
ber 12
2010 
March 19
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
A Chinese patrol vessel seizes a Viet-
namese fishing boat and its 12-man 
crew
2009 
August 1
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China
13 Vietnamese fishermen detained 
while seeking shelter from an approach-
ing typhoon
2009 June 16
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China 12 Vietnamese fishermen arrested 
by Chinese fishing patrol
2007 July 9
The Paracel 
Islands
Vietnam–China A Vietnamese fishing boat sinks after 
being rammed by a Chinese vessel
2007 April
The Spratly 
Islands
Vietnam–China 4 Vietnamese fishing boats detained 
by China
2004 January
Palawan 
Island, 
the Philip-
pines
China–the Phil-
ippines
17 Chinese fishermen caught and 
accused of poaching; released in April 
2004
2003 Sep-
tember 3
The Gulf of 
Tonkin China–Vietnam
China charges that Vietnamese gun-
boats fired on its 2 fishing vessels in 
“traditional Chinese waters” in the Gulf 
of Tonkin
2002 January 
31 – Febru-
ary 1
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
95 Chinese fishermen arrested 
by the Philippine Navy
2001 Sep-
tember 26
Palawan 
Island
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy reports that one 
of its boats fired at a Chinese fishing 
vessel after an attempted ramming 
incident near Palawan
2001 June 10
The waters 
off central 
Vietnam
China–Vietnam
Vietnamese Coast Guards seize 4 Chi-
nese vessels and their crew of 51 after 
finding them fishing
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2001 May
Philippine 
territorial 
waters off 
Palawan
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine maritime police detains  
2 Chinese fishing vessels and their crew 
of 34 for fishing illegally
2001 May 1
Philippine 
territorial 
waters off 
Palawan
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine Navy patrol boat fires 
warning shots at a Chinese fishing 
vessel
2001  
April 25
The Tonkin 
Gulf China–Vietnam
2 Vietnamese naval ships seize Dan-
zhou 72007, a Chinese fishing boat 
with 11 crew members in the southern 
fringe of the Tonkin Gulf
2001  
April 23
The Spratly 
Islands
China- the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy reports that 10 
Chinese fishing vessels intruded into 
Philippine waters off Thitu and Nansha 
Islands and Second Thomas Shoal
2001  
March 13
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine Navy boat interdicts 10 
Chinese fishing vessels and seizes their 
belongings
2001 Febru-
ary 1
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy boards 4 Chinese 
fishing boats, confiscates their catch of 
endangered sea turtles, and orders them 
to leave Philippine waters
2001  
January 31
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine Navy ships and aircraft begin 
standoff with a group of PRC fishing 
vessels
2001  
January 15
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine patrol craft spots 4 an-
chored Chinese fishing vessels
2000  
May 26
Philippine 
territorial 
waters off 
Palawan
China–the Phil-
ippines
The captain of a Chinese fishing boat 
in is killed in a gunfight with pursuing 
Philippines’ Coast Guard and maritime 
police
2000 May 
9–24
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine reconnaissance aircraft 
periodically spots Chinese fishing ves-
sels anchored near Philippine-claimed 
islands
2000  
April 26
The Spratly 
Islands (Pa-
nata Reef)
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine Air Force reconnaissance 
plane spots an anchored Chinese fish-
ing boat
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2000  
March 26
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine navy deploys two gun-
ships to convince eight Chinese fishing 
vessels still moored near Scarborough 
Shoal to leave
2000 
March 13
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine navy vessels allow nine Chi-
nese fishing crafts to shelter at Scarbor-
ough Shoal due to bad weather
2000 
March 8–12
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippines Navy sights a total of 
16 Chinese vessels fishing illegally
2000 Febru-
ary 2
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippine navy destroyer escort Rajah 
Humabon fires warning shots after 
a short chase involving two Chinese 
fishing boats the
2000 
January 30
The Spratly 
Islands
China–the Phil-
ippines
Philippines’ Armed Forces Western 
Command reports that 7 Chinese 
fishing boats have been spotted near 
Second Thomas Shoal and 3 others 
near Pagasa, Lawak, and Patag Islands
2000 
January 26
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy boards 2 Chinese 
fishing boats and orders them out
2000 
January 
24–25
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine Navy ship chases 4 Chi-
nese vessels carrying seaweed; 2 vessels 
seek refuge in shallow waters near 
the shoal
2000 
January 23
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine Air Force spots 14 Chinese 
vessels
2000
January 6
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Philippine Navy patrol spots 6 Chi-
nese vessels loaded with fish and corals
1999
July 19
The Spratly 
Islands
China–the Phil-
ippines
A Chinese fishing boats sinks in 
a disputed area after a collision with 
a Philippine Navy ship
1999 
May 23
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
Chinese fishing boat sinks after collid-
ing with the Philippines Navy;  
3 fishermen rescued and detained
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1999 March 
10
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy patrol arrests 29 
fishermen, who are later charged with 
illegal possession of explosives and 
gathering of endangered corrals
1998 January 
11
The Scarbor-
ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
More than 20 Chinese fishermen de-
tained and taken to the Subic Bay police 
station in the Philippines; released on 
May 5
1997 April The Scarbor-ough Shoal
China–the Phil-
ippines
The Philippine Navy orders a Chinese 
speedboat and two fishing boats to leave
1995 March 
4
Palawan 
Island
China–the Phil-
ippines
62 Chinese fishermen detained, taken 
to a prison in the Philippines
1995 January
The Spratly 
Islands
The Philippines–
China
A Captain of a Filipino fishing boat 
reports to Manila authorities being de-
tained or a week by some Chinese, who 
had occupied the Mischief Reef
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